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
WSAG

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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

(DCI's of)
WSAG
19 APR 75

19 April 1975

DCI BRIEFING FOR
19 APRIL WSAG MEETING

VIETNAM

- I. South Vietnam faces total defeat -- and soon.
The military situation east of Saigon is critical, and large scale attacks on ^{the} northern, western and southern approaches to the capital will probably begin within two days to a week.
 - A. Since we last met, the following combat developments have occurred.
 1. In the Xuan Loc area of operations, outmanned and outgunned government forces are now isolated and taking heavy losses.
 - a. It appears likely that the South Vietnamese 18th Division and an Airborne Brigade will be lost in the operation.
 2. Near Saigon itself, Communist sappers on April 18 attacked and damaged a large military communications facility on the southwestern outskirts of the city, but then were beaten back.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

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- a. A sapper headquarters and several sapper regiments have been noted moving closer to Saigon, and additional attacks are certain to occur almost daily from now on.
 3. Further east, the Communists yesterday captured Phan Thiet, the government's last enclave along the central coast. There are no South Vietnamese forces to prevent the North Vietnamese troops in this area from moving down to Vung Tau if they so choose. They could be there in about two days. There are GVN forces in the area, but they are ill-prepared to offer effective resistance.
 - a. If the Communists go after Vung Tau, it would probably fall within a week.
 - b. This could deny the use of the Saigon River as an evacuation route.
 4. In the northern delta, the Communists have moved units of three divisions into Long An and Dinh Tuong provinces, and there were some small attacks in Long An yesterday and today. More important, the

Communists are now in a strong position to attack along Route 4. The South Vietnamese probably will not be able to keep this vital road open to Saigon.

II. The Communists now have 12 full infantry divisions in or near MR 3 and 4, and within five days will have 17, against the government's eight.

A.

[REDACTED] the North Vietnamese First Corps headquarters, which has been moving south from North Vietnam for the past two weeks, has now moved into MR 3.

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1. Two of this Corps' four divisions are also now in MR 3, and the other two are moving south and should arrive in the region in a matter of days.
2. Five other divisions not belonging to the First Corps have also moved into or are close to MR 3. Two of these, the 325th and 304th Divisions, have moved down from the Da Nang area in the past two weeks.
3. Hanoi is also moving south additional tanks, artillery and air defense equipment,

including SA-2 missiles. Some of this hardware has already arrived in MR 3.

B. Communist artillery attacks have already forced the government to transfer most of its strike aircraft from Bien Hoa to Tan Son Nhut airbase, but the latter airport will also probably be in range of substantial harassment from Communist 122-mm and 130-mm artillery in the next two days to a week.

1. Moreover, if the SA-2s now arriving in MR 3 are put into operation along an arc north of Saigon, they will be in a position to threaten air operations into and out of Tan Son Nhut.
2. We have photographed SA-2 equipment almost daily over the past week moving down the Laos Panhandle and into MR 3. As of April 17, it was located in southern Phuoc Long province -- only 70 miles from Saigon. Once SA-2s get within these circles on the map (20 miles from Tan Son Nhut or Bien Hoa), these airfields will be within range.
3. The South Vietnamese air force carried out

air strikes against the SA-2 equipment in Phuoc Long Province on April ^{16,}~~17~~ with undetermined results. We nevertheless believe that the first SA-2s could be within these circles and operational within three days. They could also be dedicated to the I Corps Hqs, which would be the more normal defensive mission.

- C. We have in addition one recent report from a reliable source that the North Vietnamese intend to use aircraft -- both captured F-5s and some of their own MIGs -- in the final assault on Saigon.

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Hanoi has placed its air force on combat alert. Its use would have a major psychological impact on the South Vietnamese, whatever the actual military effect.

III. The heaviest combat of the next few days is likely to occur in the Bien Hoa-Long Binh area just to the north of Saigon, and it is possible that both of these places will fall within a week.

- A. At the moment, there is no panic among the

population in these areas, and there has been no large population flow from Bien Hoa to downtown Saigon.

- B. If Bien Hoa and Long Binh do fall, the loss of the major South Vietnamese military installations in both places -- headquarters, airfield, and massive ammunition and maintenance depots -- would be a very serious blow to the GVN's military prospects. The loss would not make it physically impossible for the South Vietnamese to continue fighting, but it would almost certainly create a chaotic scene in Saigon, and this could result in an immediate unravelling of the GVN and its military forces.

IV. To sum up, Saigon's military situation has now deteriorated irretrievably, and the North Vietnamese will be able to finish the city off ~~within~~
~~a month~~ if a political resolution is not reached,
~~sooner.~~

- A. A collapse of will in the GVN could bring about the end ~~much sooner~~ in a few days.

B. The NVA planning envisions victory within 10 days of the opening of the assault, and before May. In the best case, the fall should take place within 3 weeks or a month.

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CAMBODIA

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DCI BACKUP FOR
19 APRIL WSAG MEETING

CAMBODIA

- I. In Cambodia, Radio Phnom Penh has been off the air since late on April 17, and the French representative there is maintaining the only contact with the outside.
 - A. Yesterday he reported that all French newsmen in Phnom Penh were safe, casting doubt on the rumor that the Communists had executed 21 foreign journalists.
 - B. Several leading figures from the former government made last minute escapes from Phnom Penh and are now in Thailand.
 - C. It now seems fairly certain, however, that former prime minister Long Boret and his family, along with Sirik Matak, Lon Non, and former deputy prime minister Pan Sothi are among those in Communist hands.
 1. Boret and Matak were on the list of individuals the Communists said they would

execute and most of the others have been labeled "war criminals."

2. There is an unconfirmed report that Boret has already been executed, and the press claims that other captured GKR leaders have been killed.

D.

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Communists are carrying out their plans to move large numbers of civilians from Phnom Penh.

1. Most of these will go to provinces north of the capital, where one Communist official has reported that he is prepared to care for 400,000 to 500,000 people.
 2. By dispersing a large part of the capital's population in the countryside, the Communists apparently hope to ease the strain on food stocks and facilitate their consolidation of power.
 3. This mass relocation, however, will make any international relief efforts difficult.
- E. So far we have no evidence that the Communist leadership has entered Phnom Penh to formally establish their regime.

1. Their occupation plans called for the establishment of a temporary "revolutionary committee" to consolidate control in the city.
2. In the absence of any announcements from the Communists, our information on developments in the city is likely to remain fragmentary at best.
3. Prince Sihanouk is being very coy about his plans, but we expect him to return to Cambodia as a figurehead leader.

F. Meanwhile, the status of non-Communist forces in the provinces remains confused.

1. So far only the garrisons at Kompong Cham and Kompong Speu are known to have surrendered. The isolated enclaves at Takeo, Prey Veng, and Svay Rieng would appear to have little choice but to give up, and may already have done so.
2. Units at Kampot and Kompong Som have access to the sea, and may try to escape to Thailand. Commanders in the northwest have talked about forming resistance movements.

- a. Latest reports, however, indicate that the people in these areas have refused to support a resistance movement, and that the military units are trying to move overland to Thailand.
3. The Thai have said they will not grant asylum to former government personnel, and a messy situation will probably develop.